Researchers are beginning to transition from studying human–automation interaction to human–autonomy teaming. This distinction has been highlighted in recent literature, and theoretical reasons why the psychological experience of humans interacting with autonomy may vary and affect subsequent collaboration outcomes are beginning to emerge (de Visser et al., 2018;Wynne and Lyons, 2018). In this review, we do a deep dive into human–autonomy teams (HATs) by explaining the differences between automation and autonomy and by reviewing the domain of human–human teaming to make (...) inferences for HATs. We examine the domain of human–human teaming to extrapolate a few core factors that could have relevance for HATs. Notably, these factors involve critical social elements within teams that are central (as argued in this review) for HATs. We conclude by highlighting some research gaps that researchers should strive toward answering, which will ultimately facilitate a more nuanced and complete understanding of HATs in a variety of real-world contexts. (shrink)

Prior research has demonstrated that trust in robots and performance of robots are two important factors that influence human–autonomy teaming. However, other factors may influence users’ perceptions and use of autonomous systems, such as perceived intent of robots and decision authority of the robots. The current study experimentally examined participants’ trust in an autonomous security robot (ASR), perceived trustworthiness of the ASR, and desire to use an ASR that varied in levels of decision authority and benevolence. Participants (N = 340) (...) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Results revealed the participants had increased trust in the ASR when the robot was described as having benevolent intent compared to self-protective intent. There were several interactions between decision authority and intent when predicting the trust process, showing that intent may matter the most when the robot has discretion on executing that intent. Participants stated a desire to use the ASR in a military context compared to a public context. Implications for this research demonstrate that as robots become more prevalent in jobs paired with humans, factors such as transparency provided for the robot's intent and its decision authority will influence users’ trust and trustworthiness. (shrink)

When can a Bayesian investigator select an hypothesis H and design an experiment (or a sequence of experiments) to make certain that, given the experimental outcome(s), the posterior probability of H will be lower than its prior probability? We report an elementary result which establishes sufficient conditions under which this reasoning to a foregone conclusion cannot occur. Through an example, we discuss how this result extends to the perspective of an onlooker who agrees with the investigator about the statistical model (...) for the data but who holds a different prior probability for the statistical parameters of that model. We consider, specifically, one-sided and two-sided statistical hypotheses involving i.i.d. Normal data with conjugate priors. In a concluding section, using an "improper" prior, we illustrate how the preceding results depend upon the assumption that probability is countably additive. (shrink)

Ancient Greek philosophical schools are said to share a common structure in their ethical theories which is characterized by a eudaimonistic teleology based in an understanding of human nature. At first glance, the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus as described in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism seems to fit into this model insofar as he describes the end of the skeptic as ataraxia, a common account of the expression of human happiness. I argue that this is a misunderstanding of Sextus’s philosophy for (...) several reasons. “The end of skepticism” cannot be eudaimonistic or teleological in the way that other ancient ethical theories are typically understood; moreover, ataraxia is not an end derived from a theory about human nature. For these reasons, the skeptical way of life is radically different than the ethical theories proposed by other schools. I argue that this difference is a result of the character of the skeptical enterprise which involves the implicit rejection of norms in both the epistemological and the ethical spheres. (shrink)

According to Mark Rubinstein ‘In 1952, anticipating Kenneth Arrow and John Pratt by over a decade, he [de Finetti] formulated the notion of absolute risk aversion, used it in connection with risk premia for small bets, and discussed the special case of constant absolute risk aversion.’ The purpose of this note is to ascertain the extent to which this is true, and at the same time, to correct certain minor errors that appear in de Finetti's work.

Pyrrhonian skeptics, according to Sextus Empiricus, suspend judgment in the face of equally strong oppositions, but they also continue to investigate. This joint characterization has puzzled scholars: Why keep investigating if the evidence demands epochē? On this point, Sextus has been accused of muddled thinking at best and incoherence at worst. In this paper, I explain how investigative activity harmonizes with the suspensive mindset. My interpretation helps to explain several puzzling features of Pyrrhonian philosophy in addition to the idea that (...) one can both suspend judgment and continue investigating. (shrink)

First published in 1881, as part of the Pitt Press Series, this book presents a guide to classical philosophy aimed at undergraduates and those studying the works of Cicero, Plato or Aristotle. All quotations are in the original Greek and Latin. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the history of philosophy and perspectives on classical thought.

The concentration of low‐density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol (C) in plasma is a key determinant of cardiovascular disease risk and human genetic studies have long endeavoured to elucidate the pathways that regulate LDL metabolism. Massive genome‐wide association studies (GWASs) of common genetic variation associated with LDL‐C in the population have implicated SORT1 in LDL metabolism. Using experimental paradigms and standards appropriate for understanding the mechanisms by which common variants alter phenotypic expression, three recent publications have presented divergent and even contradictory findings. (...) Interestingly, although these reports each linked SORT1 to LDL metabolism, they did not agree on a mechanism to explain the association. Here, we review recent mechanistic studies of SORT1 – the first gene identified by GWAS as a determinant of plasma LDL‐C to be evaluated mechanistically. (shrink)

A donation paradox occurs when a player gives an apparently valuable prerogative to another player, but ‘does better’, according to some criterion. Peremptory challenges, used in choosing a American jury, permit each side to veto a certain number of potential jurors. With even a very simple model of jury selection, it is shown that for one side to give a peremptory challenge to the other side may lead to a more favorable jury, an instance of the donation paradox. Both a (...) theorem and examples are given concerning the existence of the donation paradox in the optimal use of peremptory challenges. (shrink)

Over the past 50 years, academic-industrial collaborations and technology transfer have played an increasingly prominent role in the biomedical sciences. These relationships can speed the delivery of innovative drugs and medical technologies to clinical practice, creating important public health benefits as well as income for universities and their faculty. At the same time, they raise ethical concerns, particularly when research involves human subjects in clinical trials. Lapses in oversight of industry sponsored clinical trials at universities, and especially patient deaths in (...) a number of trials, have brought these issues into the public spotlight and have led the federal government to intensify its oversight of clinical research. The leadership of Harvard Medical School convened a group of leaders in academic medicine to formulate guidelines on individual financial conflicts of interest. They and other groups are working to formulate a national consensus on this issue. (shrink)

This important collection of essays is a synthesis of foundational studies in Bayesian decision theory and statistics. An overarching topic of the collection is understanding how the norms for Bayesian decision making should apply in settings with more than one rational decision maker and then tracing out some of the consequences of this turn for Bayesian statistics. There are four principal themes to the collection: cooperative, non-sequential decisions; the representation and measurement of 'partially ordered' preferences; non-cooperative, sequential decisions; and pooling (...) rules and Bayesian dynamics for sets of probabilities. The volume will be particularly valuable to philosophers concerned with decision theory, probability, and statistics, statisticians, mathematicians, and economists. (shrink)

Experimenters sometimes insist that it is unwise to examine data before determining how to analyze them, as it creates the potential for biased results. I explore the rationale behind this methodological guideline from the standpoint of an error statistical theory of evidence, and I discuss a method of evaluating evidence in some contexts when this predesignation rule has been violated. I illustrate the problem of potential bias, and the method by which it may be addressed, with an example from the (...) search for the top quark. A point in favor of the error statistical theory is its ability, demonstrated here, to explicate such methodological problems and suggest solutions, within the framework of an objective theory of evidence. (shrink)

Functional localization is a central aim of cognitive neuroscience. But the nature and extent of functional localization in the human brain have been subjects of fierce theoretical debate since the 19th Century. In this essay, I first examine how concepts of functional localization have changed over time. I then analyze contemporary challenges to functional localization drawing from research on neural reuse, neural degeneracy, and the context-dependence of neural functions. I explore the consequences of these challenges for topics in philosophy of (...) science and philosophy of mind including localizationist versus anti-localizationist approaches to cognitive neuroscience, multiple realizability, reverse inference in functional neuroimaging, and the modularity of mind. (shrink)

This book provides an elaboration and evaluation of the dominant conceptions of genetic counseling as they are accounted for in three different models: the teaching model; the psychotherapeutic model; and the responsibility model. The elaboration of these models involves an identification of the larger traditions, visions and theories of communication that underwrite them; the evaluation entails an assessment of each model’s theses and ultimately a comparison of their adequacy in response to two important concerns in genetic counseling: the contested values (...) of non-directiveness and the recognition of differences across perspectives, with special focus on how religious and spiritual beliefs of patients are coordinated with the networks of meaning in genetics. Several insights are made explicit in this project through the work of Robert Brandom. Brandom’s deontic scorekeeping model demonstrates how dialogue is at the root of grasping a conceptual content. Against this backdrop, professional communications such as genetic counseling can be seen as late developments in linguistic practices that have structural challenges. Brandom’s model reminds us that the professional needs the client’s understanding to grasp conceptual content in a particular context. (shrink)

Multifunctionality poses significant challenges for human brain mapping. Cathy Price and Karl Friston argue that brain regions perform many functions in one sense and a single function in another. Thus, neuroscientists must revise their “cognitive ontologies” to obtain systematic mappings. Colin Klein draws a different lesson from these findings: neuroscientists should abandon systematic mappings for context-sensitive ones. I claim that neither account succeeds as a general treatment of multifunctionality. I argue that brain areas, like genes or organs, are multifunctional in (...) different ways. I call this the “functional heterogeneity hypothesis.” I contend that different multifunctional parts require different mapping strategies. (shrink)